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Abstract 
After decades of economic expansion, largely at the expense of environmental quality, 
new trends in environmental governance are taking shape in Asia. This paper analyses 
these developments in China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia. It finds that environmental 
governance within a “traditional” agenda of environmental protection remains severely 
hampered by capacity constraints. Simultaneously, all four countries have embarked on 
ambitious policy initiatives to address climate change and promote clean technologies, sig-
naling an important shift in national priorities. The paper discusses possible implications of 
these trends, sketching possible scenarios for the further development of environmental 
governance. 
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The rapidly industrializing countries of Asia have undergone a remarkable process of eco-
nomic development. Economic progress that took centuries to be realized in the West is 
being accomplished in decades in Asia. This rapid economic expansion is accompanied by 
corresponding pressures on natural resources and environmental quality. Since the turn of 
the century the region has become the world’s largest consumer of resources. Moreover, 
the intensity of resource use is more than 50 percent higher than the world average. Simi-
larly, pollution levels are continuing to increase in tandem with economic growth 
(UNESCAP, ADB, & UNEP, 2010). As indicated by these data, rapid economic development, 
which is fuelled by high levels of resource consumption, has taken precedent over the 
long-term need to preserve the environment. Governmental policies have focused on eco-
nomic management and the preservation of social stability, neglecting the development of 
corresponding policies for environmental protection.  
However, economic development is not only a driver of environmental deterioration. In-
creasingly it is also a motivation for efforts to increase resource efficiency. The limits of a 
development model built on the production of low-value-added, resource-intensive exports 
have been recognized. This insight has been further underlined by the global financial cri-
sis and its impact on the ability of Western markets to absorb Asian exports. Moreover, as 
an increasing scarcity of natural resources drives up input costs, investments in resource-
efficiency as well as renewable energies become increasingly attractive (Association of 
Academies of Sciences in Asia, 2011). Finally, with demand for clean technologies increas-
ing internationally, it has become an important source of current and projected economic 
growth, with Asian countries competing for leadership in these expanding markets. 
In addition to these economic imperatives, the international debate on climate change is 
providing further impetus for change. On the one hand, emerging countries are under in-
creasing pressure from industrialized countries to offer a commitment to reduce carbon 
emissions and increase efficiency. On the other hand, the particular vulnerability of the 
region to the impacts of climate change is inducing governments to formulate correspond-
ing policies.  
These developments help explain why environmental issues are beginning to feature more 
prominently on the agendas of these emerging economies. Governments in the region have 
come out strongly in favor of supporting a transition to a more environmentally friendly 
development model, launching a number of regional initiatives. At the 5th Ministerial Con-
ference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific, they adopted the Seoul 
Initiative on Environmentally Sustainable Economic Growth (Green Growth) and launched 
the Regional Implementation Plan for Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, 
2006-2010. Both initiatives provide frameworks for policy consultations and capacity-
R. Quitzow, H. Bär und K. Jacob 
 
2
building for the promotion of environmentally-friendly development (UNESCAP, 2005). Sim-
ilar trends are visible at the national level. A number of Asian countries have begun focus-
ing significant resources in the environmental policy field, particularly in the area of cli-
mate policy and the development of clean technologies. Innovative policy approaches and 
a high-level commitment to environmental issues are beginning to reshape environmental 
governance in these countries. 
This paper takes a closer look at how these developments are taking shape in four Asian 
countries (China, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia). Based on a framework inspired by the 
concept of capacity for environmental policy (Jänicke & Weidner, 1997, 2002) the paper 
explores the development of environmental governance in the respective countries, distin-
guishing between a traditional and a modern agenda of environmental protection. We ar-
gue that differing pressures and incentives in the respective realms of environmental poli-
cy have given rise to an unbalanced process of capacity development. While capacities in 
the traditional environmental policy field remain weak, the modern agenda has advanced 
at a much higher pace in recent years. The combination of international pressure in the 
field of climate change as well as incentives offered by the rising demand for green prod-
ucts have driven rapid advances in the realm of climate policy and clean technology devel-
opment. Based on this disaggregated perspective, the paper finally draws a number of 
conclusions regarding the future of environmental governance in the four countries and 
highlights a number of opportunities for further capacity development. 
2 Capacities for Environmental Governance 
We define capacities as opportunity structures for actors to pursue goals of environmental 
protection and implement respective measures. This broad definition is in line with earlier 
work of Jänicke and Weidner (1997) and Weidner and Jänicke (2002) and goes beyond the 
narrow understanding of administrative capacities only (Boerzel, 2000; Peters, 1996). Such 
comprehensive capacities entail: 
• the legal and institutional framework; 
• the knowledge base for taking decisions; 
• governmental organizations that are capable of enforcing decisions or which pro-
vide the incentives for actors to change their behavior  
• institutions and mechanisms to enforce the integration of environmental concerns 
in other domains of decision making.  
These capacities for environmental governance describe the potentials for protecting natu-
ral resource and to limit emissions. They entail the legitimacy to act, the resources (budg-
et, staff, knowledge) to take decisions and their surveillance and enforcement. Further-
more, it is recognized that environmental governance is not limited to the State only. Im-
portant capacities are also provided by non-state actors, such as actors and management 




systems within business, the media and civil society. Although the main focus in the fol-
lowing analysis is placed on the public sector, the role of these actors, in particular civil 
society is also briefly considered. 
Furthermore, due to different drivers and problem structures, capacities for environmental 
governance are issue-specific. A country may have high capacities for e.g. the protection 
of biodiversity, but at the same time a lack of capacities for e.g. the management of haz-
ardous chemicals (Klaus  Jacob, Busch, & Künkel, 2007).  In this paper, we distinguish be-
tween capacities in two broad areas of environmental protection. On the one hand, there 
is the traditional agenda of pollution control and natural resources management, beginning 
its development in the 70s and 80s. On the other hand, there is a modern agenda focused 
on clean technologies and climate policies, which has emerged more recently and which 
has received increasing attention in the past years.  
Ecological modernization theory would suggest spillovers between different issue areas of 
environmental protection. New actors, institutions and increasing preferences for a clean 
environment are expected to enable further advances in environmental protection 
(Jänicke & Weidner, 1997). With this in mind, we compare these two areas of environment 
governance in India, China, Vietnam and Indonesia. The selected countries represent im-
portant emerging economies that have witnessed rapid economic development in the past 
decades. We shed light on how this is being complemented by the emergence of differing 
modes of environmental governance. 
3 The Development of Traditional Environmental Governance  
The following section provides an overview of how the traditional environmental policy 
agenda has developed in the four countries over the past decades and identifies the re-
maining constraints for effective environmental management. Each section begins with a 
brief synopsis of the country’s broader development trajectory, followed by a more de-
tailed analysis of parallel advances in environmental governance. It concludes with a sum-
mary of key similarities and differences between the four cases.  
3.1 India 
In 1991, a severe macro-economic crisis helped trigger a series of economic reforms that 
have placed India on an impressive growth path ever since. Building on a number of steps 
taken in the 1980s, India turned its back on its highly regulated, inward-oriented develop-
ment model. The government opened the economy to greater private sector participation, 
dismantling industrial licensing, reducing the role of state-owned enterprises and encour-
aging foreign-direct investment (Das, 2006). Embracing a more open trade policy regime, 
import licensing was abolished, tariffs were slashed and the exchange rate liberalized 
leading to a devaluation of the Rupee (Ahluwalia & Little, 1998). The economic results 
have been impressive with annual growth rates averaging just below 6 percent throughout 
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the 1980s and 1990s and accelerating to more than 7 percent since the turn of the century 
(Ahmed & Varshney, 2008).  
While India’s transition from a dirigiste to a modern, incentive-based model of economic 
management has fueled rapid economic expansion, environmental management practices 
have failed to keep pace with these changes. Environmental governance still adheres to a 
command-and-control approach recognized as increasingly inadequate for managing the 
country’s diverse set of environmental challenges. The instruments available to the envi-
ronmental authorities no longer match the complexity of the Indian economy and the mul-
tiple sources of environmental pollution, including a heterogeneous industrial sector, un-
managed urban development and overstretched infrastructure. Most significantly, regula-
tions are largely designed to control large point pollution sources, ignoring the important 
role played by small and medium-sized businesses and the cumulative nature of environ-
mental impacts (World Bank, 2006). Moreover, regulators lack the required instruments for 
imposing credible sanctions on those violating environmental standards. As a result, envi-
ronmental agencies are largely dependent on the courts for enforcement. However, the 
judicial process is not only slow, it also frequently favors the defendants who benefit from 
inadequate monitoring procedures on the part of the regulators (OECD, 2006b).  
The government has officially recognized the need for more fiscal and market-based in-
struments in its Policy Statement on Pollution Abatement published in 1992 (Sankar, 1998, 
pp. 4-5). In 1995, it followed up on this statement and created a task force to investigate 
the scope of market-based instruments for controlling industrial pollution. Despite these 
efforts, market-based instruments still play an insignificant role in the country’s approach 
to environmental management. Moreover, existing fiscal instruments largely aim to pro-
mote compliance with regulatory standards, rather than providing dynamic incentives for 
investments in pollution control. For example, a 25 percent rebate on water cess is provid-
ed to firms that comply with relevant standards regulating water use (OECD, 2006b, p. 22). 
The cess itself, however, is not high enough to provide any relevant incentive for increased 
investments (Kumar & Managi, 2009, p. 44). A number of approaches combining subsidies 
with informational instruments have shown positive results but remain limited in their 
scope. The most successful schemes have combined tighter environmental standards and 
stricter enforcement with subsidies and technical assistance (World Bank, 2006, p. 40). 
However, to date these integrated approaches remain local pilot schemes waiting to be 
scaled up. The national Eco-Label Program ECOMARK on the other hand has had little suc-
cess in enhancing environmental performance, failing to attract significant participation by 
the private sector (Kern, Kissling-Näf, Landmann, & Mauch, 2001).1 
                                            
 
1 See also Ecomark scheme cries for industry attention, June 10, 2006, Financial Express.  




Despite early efforts to establish the required institutions for environmental governance, 
institutional constraints represent another key bottleneck for effective environmental pro-
tection. Following the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, the 
Indian government created the National Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordi-
nation (NCEPC), implementing first policy measures shortly thereafter. With the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 national and state-level environmental 
agencies (the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Boards 
(SPCB)) were created (Sankar, 1998, p. 11). These statutory bodies are responsible for im-
plementing and enforcing legislation related to water and air pollution (Kumar & Managi, 
2009, p. 42). The next step was taken in 1980 with the creation of the Department of the 
Environment. This was converted into the current Ministry of the Environment and Forests 
(MoEF) in 1985, responsible for “the planning, promotion and coordination of environmen-
tal and forestry programmes” (India, 1995, cited in Kumar and Managi 2009: p. 41).  
Despite its inadequacy to respond to the increasingly complex set of environmental chal-
lenges, this institutional structure has remained in place ever since. Responding to these 
shortcomings, a number of government reports have called for an institutional redesign of 
both the ministry and the CPCB. In a recent report, the MoEF stated, “there are gaps in 
the institutional mechanisms”, and ”[q]uite clearly, while our environmental laws have 
been progressive, implementation by government agencies has left much to be desired. 
The institutional structures in their current form are inadequate for responding to the 
emerging environmental challenges” (Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), 2009, 
p. 2). A major shortcoming relates to the gap between central and state-level authorities, 
preventing consistent implementation of federal legislation. Although the CPCB has formal 
oversight over the SPCBs, there are few formal coordinating mechanisms. Moreover, SPCBs 
are embedded in a dual command structure, as they also receive funding and directives 
from state-level governments (OECD, 2006b, p. 14). Moreover, capacity of different SPCBs 
is highly uneven, with the number of technical staff ranging from 300 to only 4. This finds 
its parallel in the uneven financial means of the SPCBs whose budgets are largely financed 
by highly divergent state-level water charges (OECD, 2006b, pp. 11, 14).  
Horizontal policy integration also suffers from a lack of coordination across India’s highly 
fragmented ministerial structure, a challenge recognized by the government in its Eleventh 
Five Year Plan (Planning Commission, 2007, pp. 191-192). To address this problem, the 
government has proposed a number of measures, including converting the CPCB into a full-
fledged Environmental Protection Authority with an expanded mandate and creating “an 
independent, statutory body on sustainable development with the specific responsibility of 
guiding government policies and programs for making them more socially and environmen-
tally sustainable, and to monitor and evaluate their outcomes” (Planning Commission, 
2007, p. 192). To date, none of these proposals has been implemented, and environmental 
policy integration within policy and planning remains rudimentary. At the project level, 
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environmental impact assessments (EIA) have been made mandatory for a relatively wide 
spectrum of industrial projects, although enforcement is restricted to larger firms (OECD, 
2006b, pp. 15-16). 
These deficits in the implementation of environmental policy are contrasted by a fairly 
comprehensive legislative framework developed since the mid-1980s. In response to a cat-
astrophic accident in a US-owned chemical factory at Bhopal, the government passed the 
Environmental Protection Act (EPA) in 1986. Along with the MoEF, the EPA established an 
overarching framework for environmental policy in the country. In direct response to the 
Bhopal incident, the law also contained regulations for the management of hazardous 
waste and established procedures for the prevention and mitigation of environmental im-
pacts from industrial activities. The EPA has since formed the basis for the further devel-
opment of environmental legislation, including legislation in the areas of transport, wild 
life protection, biodiversity protection, energy efficiency and water resources manage-
ment.  
Parallel to these legislative developments, a landmark decision by the Supreme Court in 
1985 played a central role in shaping environmental governance in India. Due to the pollu-
tion of local spring waters, local groups in the state of Uttar Pradesh had initiated a law-
suit against local limestone quarries, claiming their constitutional right to a healthy envi-
ronment. The court upheld this right and ordered the closure of 53 out of 60 lime quarries 
in the State (World Bank, 2006, p. 18). This legal precedent established public interest liti-
gation as another central pillar of Indian environmental governance, giving the judiciary a 
key role in driving policy changes. Where government intervention is considered inade-
quate, local civil society groups have frequently turned to the courts to force state action.  
The role of public interest litigation has remained a distinct feature of Indian environmen-
tal governance. Moreover, it has helped promote a very vocal and at times combative civil 
society. The emergence of environmental activism in India has been closely linked to social 
conflicts over access to natural resources and large infrastructure projects. Especially dis-
putes over the use of the country’s forestry resources as well as large scale transport or 
industrial projects remain important topics of public confrontation (Gadgil & Guha, 2007, 
p. 388; World Bank, 2006, p. 18) In more recent years, the growing middle class has added 
an additional dimension to public pressure for an improved environmental quality. Advo-
cating for quality of life improvements, this green constituency has emerged as a driver for 
better pollution control in India’s urban centers (Narain & Bell, 2005). 





The rapid rise of China to one of the world’s economic power houses and largest consumer 
markets is well known. Initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China’s liberalization process 
has proven highly successful in driving economic growth. GDP per capita2 today is more 
than 20 times its level in 1981. While the Chinese economy has surged ahead, environmen-
tal governance has only seen gradual development, lagging behind not only Western coun-
tries but many of its Asian neighbors. As a result, pressures on the environment have con-
tinued to grow. The challenge of the country’s deteriorating water resources are an im-
portant case in point. In 2006, only 40 percent of water resources remained suitable for 
drinking and fishing, and 28 percent were not even suitable for industrial use (Qiu & Li, 
2009).   
Officially, environmental policy development in China has gone hand in hand with econom-
ic liberalization. It began in 1979 with the adoption of China’s first Law on Environmental 
Protection, which remains the basis of Chinese environmental policy. In 1983, another im-
portant step was taken when the State Council elevated environmental protection to a 
basic state policy (Wang, 2010, p. 1207). Having completed a ten-year trial period, a re-
newed version of the Law on Environmental Protection went into force in 1989. This up-
dated law introduced several new principles and instruments of environmental policy, in-
cluding the discharge permitting system for environmental and emission standards, the so-
called “Three Synchronisations” as a standard for licensing industrial plants3, as well as 
environmental impact assessment (OECD, 2006a; J.  Watts, 2011b). Shortly thereafter, the 
2nd National Conference on the Prevention and Control of Industrial Pollution developed 
the “Three Shifts” approach to regulating industrial pollution. The point of regulation was 
shifted from managing the wastes and damages of industrial activity towards reducing 
them in the industrial processes (Zhang & Wen, 2008, p. 1252). Continuing the focus on 
managing industrial processes, the end of the 1990s saw the introduction of the ISO 14000 
Environmental Management System after a pilot phase supported by international partners. 
In 2003, the Law on Cleaner Production was adopted, requiring local governments to sup-
port cleaner production measures by issuing handbooks, conducting trainings and providing 
financial incentives. In recent years, a number of measures, including the introduction of 
                                            
 
2 Based on current US dollars. see http://data.worldbank.org/. 
3 The system of the “Three Synchronisations” mandates “that (1) the design, (2) the construction; and (3) the 
operation of a new industrial enterprise (or an existing factory expanding or changing its operations) be syn-
chronised with the design, construction and operation of an appropriate pollution treatment facility” (OECD, 
2006, p. 22). 
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environmental impact assessments and provisions for imposing sanctions on firms violating 
environmental standards, have followed (Wang, 2010). 
While most gaps in the legislative framework have been eliminated, a significant challenge 
has been the formulation of consistent implementing regulations. Authored by different 
entities at different points in time, the resulting regulatory framework is characterized by 
a high level of complexity (Zhang & Wen, 2008, p. 1252). National ambient and emission 
standards for the most important air, water and soil pollutants are in place, but may be 
adapted by local authorities to fit their needs. As a result, in addition to more than 40 reg-
ulations and 500 standards at the national level, approximately 1000 local-level regulations 
have been established (Stalley & Yang, 2006). Firms are, therefore, frequently confronted 
with differing environmental standards, issued at different levels of government. Further-
more, environmental charges have been introduced for exceeding established environmen-
tal standards but are generally too low to provide any incentives for businesses to reduce 
their emissions (Chen, 2009, pp. 22-23; Wang, 2010, p. 1208)  
To counter-balance the ineffectiveness of these instruments, the Chinese government has 
recently begun experimenting with reward schemes for companies that can demonstrate a 
particularly strong performance in environmental management. These companies receive 
not only public recognition for their achievement, but may attain privileged access to gov-
ernment subsidies, enjoy accelerated permitting procedures and less frequent inspections 
(OECD, 2006a, p. 36). The government has also experimented with trading schemes in sul-
phur dioxide emissions. However, after concluding two pilot phases at the city (1990 to 
1994) and the provincial level (2002 to 2003), the schemes were discontinued.  
The institutional framework for environmental governance remains fairly weak, making 
policy implementation a particular challenge. In 1985 the government created the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to monitor local and regional air pollutants, but 
left responsibility for policy implementation with sectoral ministries. It took more than a 
decade, until NEPA was upgraded to the State Environmental Protection Agency and at-
tained full ministerial rank. In 2008, it was renamed the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion (MEP) and finally became a permanent member of the State Council, a key to increas-
ing its political authority. The ministry’s capacities in terms of staff and funding have been 
moderately increased since this formal upgrade (J. Liu & Diamond, 2008, p. 37; Qiu & Li, 
2009).4 Accordingly, government expenditures on pollution control and enforcement have 
also increased in recent years (Remais & Zhang, 2011).  
                                            
 
4 As a comparison, Liu and Diamond point out that MEP has only one eighth of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency’s staff (Liu & Diamond, 2008, p. 37). 




Despite these positive signs, the ministry’s mandate remains relatively weak and overlaps 
with those of other sector ministries (Qiu & Li, 2009). Moreover, environmental policy mak-
ing is still largely controlled by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
which itself remains dominated by economic imperatives (OECD, 2006a, pp. 15-16). Espe-
cially in the area of energy policy, the importance of MEP is marginal, and the economic 
interests of the powerful state energy companies continue to have an important influence 
on policy development. 
Local administration of environmental policies is managed by so-called Environmental Pro-
tection Bureaus (EPB), which exist at the district, municipal and provincial level. Financial-
ly dependent on the respective local government, they typically lack proper incentives and 
resources to take on conflicting interests of local stakeholders (Qiu & Li, 2009; Tao & Ngar-
yin Mah, 2009). For instance, early polluter pays scheme have proven ineffective, as they 
lacked effective incentives for both the polluting firm and the local EPBs. Firstly, the 
charges were lower than the costs of addressing the actual problem. Secondly, had they 
enforced the prevailing standards, local authorities would have reduced their revenues 
from the scheme (Zhang, Wen, & Peng, 2008, p. 133). Another challenge for local imple-
mentation is a highly ambiguous distribution of authorities across the different levels of 
government. According to the Environmental Protection Law, the EPBs at the provincial, 
municipal and district level all retain virtually the same authority to manage environmen-
tal affairs, although they may have distinct strategies and interests. This unclear distribu-
tion of authority leads to competing interests and conflicting goals between different 
EPBs. In other cases, EPBs may ignore violations of environmental regulations based on the 
assumption that another EPB is responsible (Qiu & Li, 2009).  
In some cases, this inadequate framework for policy implementation has been counterbal-
anced by heavy-handed intervention by the central government. A striking example is the 
action taken to clean up the Huái Hé river. Industrial emissions directly discharged into the 
river had led to unmanageable levels of pollution, so that the government decided to simp-
ly close down a large number of polluting businesses. Between 1996 and 2000 more than 
80,000 small firms in highly polluting sectors, such as paper and pulp production, textiles, 
chemical industry and agriculture, were forced out of business (Zhang & Wen, 2008, p. 
1251).  
Though not a system-wide solution, these interventions demonstrate the important role 
that central planning continues to play. Another important element in this regard is the 
use of long-term plans to integrate different and at times conflicting policy goals. The five-
year plans issued by the NDRC regularly contain the goal of strengthening environmental 
protection (J. Liu & Diamond, 2008, p. 37). A strength of the plans is that they develop 
clear and verifiable goals – such as to increase the share of renewable energies to 15% until 
2020 (likely to be met early) or the reduction of water use by 30 percent by 2010, which 
was exceeded (German Ministry of Environment (BMU), 2009; National Development and 
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Reform Commission, 2011, pp. 399-400). Early attempts to develop a Green GDP indicator 
to strengthen policy integration in the planning process have been stalled, however, after 
scientific studies provided estimates that environmental costs amounted to between 7,5 
and 15,6 percent of annual economic growth (Morton, 2005, p. 132; Zhang et al., 2008, p. 
136). Finally, the government has issued a number of environmental policy plans, including 
a sustainable development strategy and the China Trans-Century Green Project. These 
strategies primarily serve as catalysts for pilot projects, which may later influence broader 
policy development.  
While environmental policy making is generally top-down, originating from the central 
government, it allows for a limited form of citizen involvement through so-called govern-
ment-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), as well as some independent 
Chinese and international NGOs that have to be accredited by the Chinese government 
(Klawitter, 2004, p. 11). According to official statistics, there are about 3500 environmen-
tal groups. About a third of these organizations are GONGOs, another third are student 
groups, and the last third is made up of other types of organizations. These groups general-
ly do not engage in advocacy, but participate in dialogues and information sharing orga-
nized by the government. Opinions about the strength of the environmental organizations 
and their possible impact vary significantly between authors (Stalley & Yang, 2006, p. 
338). Another vehicle for citizens to directly communicate environmental problems to the 
government are telephone hotlines for reporting grievances to improve government effec-
tiveness (OECD, 2006a, p. 33; Stalley & Yang, 2006, p. 333).  
3.3 Vietnam 
In Vietnam, rapid economic development began with the launch of the government’s doi 
moi (renovation) policy in 1986. Removing subsidies and price distortions, allowing in-
creased private ownership and opening the country to the international market, it has 
steered the country from a centrally planned model to what the government refers to as a 
“socialist-oriented market economy” (Fahey, 1997; V. X. Han & Baumgarte, 2000). The re-
sults in delivering growth and poverty reduction have been unprecedented. Still one of the 
poorest countries in the world in the late 1980s, Vietnam has now assumed the status of a 
“middle-income country”5 (Rama, 2008; Vietnam Development Report, 2011). Simultane-
                                            
 
5 Based on the World Bank’s definition, a lower middle income country is defined as a country with a GNI per 
capita of more then $996, calculated based on the World Bank’s Atlas method. Vietnam passed this mark in 
2009 with a GNI per capita of $1000. For more information, see http://data.worldbank.org/.   




ously, poverty rates have been reduced from over 60 percent in 1993 to 13 percent in 
2008.6  
With the initiation of the doi moi, the government also began addressing environmental 
risks in policy discussions (Beresford & Fraser, 1992). A National Conservation Strategy was 
developed in 1985, but never officially adopted. This laid the basis for the National Plan 
for Environment and Sustainable Development presented in 1991. The plan outlined a 
strategy for the sustainable management of the country’s natural resources to secure the 
basic needs of present and future generations. It formulated goals for the development of 
adequate environmental legislation and established the National Environment Protection 
Agency and institutions for environmental research. Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Sci-
ence, Technology and Environment (MOSTE) (since 2002 Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MONRE)) and its implementing agency, the Vietnamese Environment Agency 
(since 2008 Vietnam Environment Administration (VEA)), were created and in 1993 the Na-
tional Law on Environmental Protection was passed. 
However, despite the transition from a socialist command economy to a market-driven 
model, the new environmental policy framework remained dominated by a highly central-
ized logic of “command-and-control”. The new law and subsequent regulations set a num-
ber of standards and rules for environmental protection, but largely failed to guarantee 
the enforcement of the legal framework (Mitchell, 2006). Moreover, throughout the 1990s 
a number of partly overlapping laws addressing environmental issues from a sectoral per-
spective were passed, including the Law on Forest Protection and Development (1991), the 
Law on Land (1993), the Mineral Law (1996), and the Law on Water Resources (1999). A 
lack of coherence between these different legislative measures has further hampered ef-
fective implementation, a weakness acknowledged by the government (Communist Party of 
Vietnam, 1998). To tackle some of these inconsistencies, the Law of Environmental Protec-
tion was revised in 2005. Though failing to fully eliminate inconsistencies and overlaps with 
sectoral legislation, it has broadened the scope and the density of the legislative frame-
work. It has also introduced a number of new policy instruments, such as a license system 
for producers of toxic waste, an expanded framework for environmental impact assess-
ment and an environmental protection fund financed in part through levies imposed on the 
use of natural resources (Mehling, 2008). 
A further challenge relates to the limited institutional capacity and the relatively weak po-
sition of the Vietnamese environment ministry vis-à-vis its sectoral counterparts. With the 
Law on Environmental Protection environmental units were created in all the line minis-
tries (O'Rourke, 2004, pp. 47-48). However, rather than enhancing the coordination across 
                                            
 
6 Based on a poverty line of $1.25 (PPP) per day. See http://data.worldbank.org.   
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ministerial boundaries, overlapping mandates have frequently caused frictions between 
the environment ministry and the respective sector ministries (Molle, 2005; MoNRE, World 
Bank, & DANIDA, 2006; World Bank, MoNRE, & CIDA, 2004). Furthermore, implementation 
of policies depends on the cooperation between the VEA and local Departments of Natural 
Resources and Environment (DONRE). Although the DONRE are dependent on the VEA for 
technical support, they remain accountable to local People’s Committees.7 Driven primari-
ly by economic imperatives, the goals of the People’s Committees are often at odds with 
national environmental policy objectives. The resulting lack of cooperation frequently ag-
gravates important capacity constraints at the local level (World Bank, 2008).  
Despite these implementation deficits, the government was able to make advances in indi-
vidual policy areas. In particular in the forestry sector, the government policy was success-
ful in reducing, if not eliminating, the negative impacts from related economic activities. 
While forest cover was reduced from 42 percent to 27 percent of the country’s territory in 
the period from 1943 to 1990, this trend was reversed in the 1990s. In collaboration with 
the international donor community, the government implemented large-scale reforestation 
programs. Placing an important emphasis on the active involvement of local populations, 
the programs allocated forest land to households and provided financial incentives for re-
forestation (Poffenberger, 1998). Simultaneously, the productivity of agricultural produc-
tion greatly increased, thus reducing the need for further expansion of agricultural lands. 
As a result, forest cover had climbed back to 38 percent by 2003 - albeit mostly in the 
form of forestry plantations, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of forest 
eco-systems (Meyfroidt & Lambin, 2008).  
Despite these caveats, Vietnam’s forestry policies have demonstrated how the empower-
ment of local stakeholders can contribute to the local implementation of national envi-
ronmental policy targets. Beyond the forestry sector, the pro-active involvement of local 
stakeholders in environmental management remains fairly limited, however. Instead local 
populations have increasingly used the provisions of the Law of Environmental Protection 
and the Grassroots Democracy Decree issued in 1998 to advocate for more effective im-
plementation of environmental legislation. The laws give local populations the formal right 
to participate in local environmental management and to file complaints when the State 
fails to enforce existing environmental standards (Ingle & Halimi, 2007). In several instanc-
es, local communities have successfully utilized these provisions to force the government 
to take action. O’Rourke (2004) has called this form of environmental governance “com-
munity-driven regulation”. As in the Indian case, local communities assume an important 
role in ensuring that existing environmental legislation is enforced by the government. The 
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model is facilitated by the fact that the government has tended to allow increasingly criti-
cal media reports on environmental issues.  
Despite an increasing openness to critical voices in the field of environmental policy, the 
growing number of environmental NGOs often financed at least partly through internation-
al channels, still function primarily as technical advisors rather than environmental advo-
cates. At the local level, corporatist organizations, like the women’s or the farmer’s asso-
ciation, frequently play a role in facilitating the implementation of local environmental 
policy initiatives. However, their role in effectively involving local communities and repre-
senting their interests is compromised by the continuing influence exerted by the govern-
ment and the Communist Party over these organizations (O’Rourke, 2004). Outside these 
government-controlled organizations, active involvement of local stakeholders in policy 
development and implementation remains very limited (UNDP, 2006). 
3.4 Indonesia 
During the second half of the 20th century, Indonesia’s wealth in natural resources, includ-
ing minerals, oil and gas and its large forestry resources, provided the basis for develop-
ment model based heavily on the exploitation of natural resources (Banerjee, 2002). While 
generating economic growth averaging approximately 7 percent from 1970 to 1997, the 
model also caused severe environmental degradation (Resosudarmoa & Irhamnia, 2008). 
The most visible effect of this development has been the depletion of forestry resources. 
From 1985 to 1997, forestry resources were reduced by almost 30 percent or close to 7 
million ha (Forest Watch Indonesia & Global Forest Watch, 2002). Furthermore, under the 
clientelist regime of President Soeharto (1967-1998), the profits derived from an increas-
ingly unsustainable exploitation of the country’s natural wealth were concentrated within 
the hands of a tightly controlled patronage network. In particular Soeharto’s family and 
the country’s military leadership were able to benefit from the successive privatization of 
the country’s natural resources (Hamilton-Hart, 2001).  
Despite high levels of corruption, the Soeharto era was accompanied by a process of eco-
nomic modernization and industrial development, helping to reduce poverty from over 60 
percent in the early 80s to an estimate 43 percent in 19968. As a result, environmental 
pressures also increased in Indonesia’s growing urban agglomerations. Especially on the 
densely populated islands of Java and Sumatra, the growth of industrial output and rapid 
urbanization coupled with inadequate waste management practices led to increasing envi-
ronmental pressures (Resosudarmo & Napitupulu, 2004; Resosudarmoa & Irhamnia, 2008; 
World Bank, 1994). Moreover, a growing population increased the demand for food prod-
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ucts, so that significant amounts of forestry and coastal areas were converted for agricul-
tural use.  
First environmental policy measures were introduced in the wake of the first UN environ-
mental conference in Stockholm in 1972. Growing international pressure led President 
Soeharto to create the State Ministry of Development Supervision and Environment9. He 
appointed his Minister of Communication and former economic policy adviser, Emil Salim, 
to head the new ministry. Remaining in the position for over 20 years, Salim developed in-
to a strong advocate for more environmental protection, often defending positions that 
were critical of government policy decisions (Gordon, 1998). To strengthen environmental 
protection, he developed the Environmental Management Act, which was passed in 1982. 
Among other things, the law emphasized the role of non-governmental organizations in 
strengthening environmental management in Indonesia, an important pillar of Salim’s 
strategy for improving environmental governance. Actively supported by the environment 
ministry and tolerated by Soeharto, this led to the rapid development of environmental 
NGOs in Indonesia (Nomura, 2007). The role of non-governmental organizations was further 
strengthened in a revision of the EMA in 1997, by introducing a provision for class action 
law suits (Kaligis, 2006; Syarif & Wibisana, 2009).  
Another important measure introduced by Salim in 1989 was the requirement for firms to 
summit an environmental impact assessment for important investment projects. One of the 
most important roles of the ministry is the evaluation of these reports for projects with na-
tional relevance. In practice, however, it has not exercised strong oversight of the EIA pro-
cess. Monitoring and review of the EIA reports and the mitigation measures they propose is 
rarely conducted (Resosudarmoa & Irhamnia, 2008).  
The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1997 and the subsequent transition to a democratic 
political system fundamentally altered the framework for environmental governance. 
While the period immediately following the crisis was dominated by efforts to promote 
economic recovery and restore political stability, the focus thereafter has been on imple-
menting a far reaching process of decentralization (see Green, 2005; Matsui, 2007 ). In 
many ways this has further exacerbated the challenge of effective environmental govern-
ance (International Development Law Organization, 2006; Klingshirn, 2009; World Bank, 
2009). It has added further complexity to a legislative framework characterized by over-
lapping and oftentimes inconsistent environmental legislation, including general and sec-
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tor-specific laws as well as regulations at the provincial and district level (Klingshirn, 2009; 
USAID, 2008; Wingqvist & Dahlberg, 2008; World Bank, 2009).  
Increasing local autonomy has also further weakened the role of the environment ministry. 
Even before decentralization, its role remained largely confined to policy development and 
coordination with enforcement authority in the hands of line ministries. With the transfer 
of power to the provincial and district level, the authority of the environment ministry has 
been further diminished. In spite of protests from civil society, the Environmental Impact 
Control Agency (BAPEDAL), previously under the remit of the ministry, was eliminated in 
2002 (Simanjuntak, 2002). With this, the Local Environmental Impact Control Agencies 
(BAPEDALDA) have been placed under the supervision of provincial authorities (USAID, 
2008). Simultaneously, important implementation functions were shifted to agencies at the 
district level (International Development Law Organization, 2006). These provincial and 
district-level organizations, however, are not required to adhere to directives from the en-
vironment ministry (USAID, 2008; World Bank, 2009).  
In acknowledgement of the deficits this has caused, the government passed a number of 
laws in 2007 and 2009 to strengthen local environmental management. The laws outline a 
framework for establishing local environmental institutions, clarify their functions and pro-
vide guidelines for their internal organizational structure. Moreover, they include a num-
ber of provisions that aim to strengthen and streamline environmental management proce-
dures. Among other things, it creates a single environmental license, integrating a variety 
of existing environmental permits. This license will be complementary to the already exist-
ing environmental impact assessment statements (AMDAL), which have to be submitted for 
activities that are likely to have a significant effect on the environment (Spitz & Lubis, 
2010). An important opportunity to promote stronger integration of environmental aspects 
in government policy may be the framework for conducting strategic environmental as-
sessment incorporated in the 2009 law (Dusik & Xie, 2009).  
The laws do not establish performance standards for local environmental management, 
however. Furthermore, local incentive structures and lack of capacity continue to prevent 
effective environmental management. Local governments have an interest to issue licenses 
for the exploitation of resources and stimulate economic activity that generates local tax 
revenue. Simultaneously, they lack the capacity to enforce environmental standards. This 
weak implementation environment is further exacerbated by high levels of local-level cor-
ruption (Klingshirn, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Finally, while many environmental problems 
transcend local jurisdictions, inter-agency collaboration remains weakly institutionalized. 
Although national law stipulates that environmental problems transcending district borders 
are subject to provincial authority, provincial governments typically take action only if 
they have been invited by district authorities (World Bank, 2009). Similarly, inter-agency 
coordination at the national level remains weak (USAID, 2008).  
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In light of its weak enforcement role, the Ministry of Environment has established a num-
ber of reputational programs to promote compliance by the private sector through self-
reporting and voluntary commitments. Most notably, the MoE launched its pioneering Pro-
gram for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating (PROPER) in 1995. Based on information 
provided by the participating firms, the program rates company performance using a sim-
ple, single-index rating system. The program has had some success in improving the per-
formance of participating firms and has been expanded to include more than 600 compa-
nies in 2008/2009. Moreover, it has widened its scope over time, adding a number of addi-
tional indicators (Afsah & Ratunanda, 1999; Afsah & Vincent, 1997; Blackman, Afsah, & 
Ratunanda, 2004; Lee, 2010). Nonetheless, critics argue that these measures can only pro-
vide a weak substitute for effective enforcement of regulations. In fact, representatives of 
Indonesian environmental organizations, including the influential Wahana Lingkungan 
Hidup Indonesia (WALHI, or Friends of the Earth Indonesia), claim that PROPER has weak-
ened regular enforcement of environmental compliance in participating companies (Lee, 
2010).  
Fiscal and tax policy have a primarily negative influence on the environment with heavy 
subsidies for electricity and fuel. In 2008, subsidies on fossil fuels represented 13 percent 
of total government expenditure (World Bank, 2009). Moreover, there is no comprehensive 
framework for establishing environmental levies and pollution charges. Some local gov-
ernments, mostly in urban areas, have introduced fees for waste disposal and waste water 
treatment. However, no comprehensive data on rates and related revenues are available, 
so that no conclusive assessment of their impact can be made (World Bank, 2003). Funds 
for local environmental management remain heavily dependent on the budget provided by 
the national government and are generally considered inadequate. In low-income districts 
regular budget allocations may be supplemented through funding from a Special Allocation 
Fund (DAK) for environmental protection. The provision of funds via the DAK represents 
one of the strongest instruments of the central government to promote good environmen-
tal governance, as it controls how these funds can be used (USAID, 2008; World Bank, 
2009). 
3.5 Synthesis: Weak capacities remain a central challenge for effective envi-
ronmental protection 
The brief overview reveals that all four countries face serious challenges regarding the 
“traditional” agenda of environmental protection. All four countries have developed an 
overall framework for environmental legislation. With the earliest efforts beginning in In-
dia and Indonesia in the 1970’s, all countries had fairly comprehensive legislation in place 
covering different environmental issues by the turn of the century. However, environmen-
tal governance remains dominated by a “command and control” approach with only a lim-
ited role for fiscal and market-based instruments. User charges are typically too low to 
provide any real incentive to reduce emissions.  




The effectiveness of command and control instruments, therefore, depends on their im-
plementation and enforcement by the administration and the judicial system. However, 
administrative capacities to implement and enforce the existing rules remain inadequate. 
Environmental ministries are weak players and coordination with relevant sector ministries 
is rare. Local policy implementation is hampered by a lack of capacity and lack of coordi-
nation across the different levels of government, resulting from conflicting local incentives 
and the weak authority vested in national environment ministries. This challenge is partic-
ular acute in the Indonesian context, where decentralization has transferred environmen-
tal management functions almost entirely to the highly autonomous district-level govern-
ments.  
To varying degrees, non-state actors may partially compensate certain limitations of envi-
ronmental administrations. India, due to its long-standing democratic tradition, has the 
strongest and most vocal environmental movement. Public interest litigation has given lo-
cal communities and civil society organizations an important vehicle for pushing the gov-
ernment to take more effective action to protect the environment. In Indonesia, NGOs 
have also played a role in advocating for more effective environmental governance, but to 
a lesser extent than in India. In Vietnam and China, civil society remains weak overall, 
though increasingly the governments are trying to provide a role for the emerging envi-
ronmental organizations. This remains within clearly defined parameters, however. In Vi-
etnam, some instances of local activism have placed pressure on the government to en-
force existing environmental policies.  
4 New Directions in Environmental Governance: the Modern 
Agenda 
After painting this rather bleak picture of capacities for environmental governance in the 
traditional domain of environmental protection, the following section presents some of the 
more recent initiatives, signaling a stronger commitment to building effective environmen-
tal governance. While many of these new initiatives tackle the challenge of climate change 
and promote the development of a low-carbon economy, they may also have broader im-
plications for environmental governance, a point further developed below.  
4.1 Climate Strategies Strengthen Environment Ministries and Promote Envi-
ronmental Policy Integration 
Climate policy represents an important focus for environmental policy development in re-
cent years, driving important new initiatives to enhance environmental governance capaci-
ties. All four countries have initiated inter-ministerial strategies for tackling climate 
change with corresponding councils or steering committees. With participation by ministers 
and even heads of government, these processes have elevated climate policy integration to 
the highest level of government. In India, for instance, the Prime Minister’s Council on 
Climate Change brings together high-level officials to develop and oversee “a coordinated 
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response to issues relating to climate change at the national level”10 (see also Janardhan-
an, 2010). Similarly, Vietnam’s National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change 
(NTP-RCC) is overseen by a steering committee chaired by the prime minister, and the In-
donesian National Council on Climate Change (DNPI) is chaired by the President. In China, 
the government has created the National Leading Committee on Climate Change (NLCCC) 
(previously National Coordination Committee on Climate Change), chaired by Premier Wen 
Jiabao. 
Critics may argue that this focus on climate policy may further distract policy makers from 
the host of traditional environmental issues that remain to be solved. However, it should 
be noted that these climate change strategies go beyond measures to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, covering a number of sector policies and placing an important emphasis on 
climate change adaptation. In other words, to varying degrees, climate change policy also 
reaches into the domains of traditional environmental policy.  
In India this is the most visible, where the NAPCC is composed of eight national missions in 
the areas of solar energy, energy efficiency, sustainable habitat, water, the Himalayan 
eco-system, forestry, agriculture and knowledge for climate change (Prime Minister's 
Council on Climate Change, 2008). Only the national missions on solar energy and energy 
efficiency fall clearly within the field of climate change mitigation. The other missions aim 
to integrate a broad set of environmental objectives in the respective policy fields. Simi-
larly, Indonesia’s National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change (NAPACC) goes well be-
yond preparing for changes in weather patterns. For instance regarding water resources, 
the NAPACC aims at the “actualization of stable water utilization in efficient, effective 
and sustainable manners for the prosperity of the whole people” (State Ministry of Envi-
ronment, 2007, p.61). On balance, China’s National Climate Change Programme and Vi-
etnam’s NTP-RCC are more focused on reducing energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions and expanding renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, both also include objec-
tives in the areas of water resources management and waste management (MoNRE, 2008; 
National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). Vietnam’s National Climate Change 
Strategy, approved in 2011, has further added biodiversity protection and afforestation as 
key climate policy goals (Government of Vietnam, 2011). 
Furthermore, climate policy has visibly strengthened the role of environment ministries in 
India, Vietnam and to a lesser degree in Indonesia. Again this trend is most notable in In-
dia. The ministry has been tasked not only with the coordination of the NAPCC but also 
with the development and oversight of state-level action plans on climate change. Observ-
ers have also pointed to the strong role of the ministry in shaping national climate policy 
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under the vocal leadership of Minister Jairam Ramesh who headed the ministry from 2009 
to 2011 (Janardhanan, 2010; Kahn, 2011; Raman, 2010). Whether these advances in raising 
the profile of the ministry will continue under his successor remains to be seen. In Vi-
etnam, the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources chairs the Executive Board for 
NTP-RCC implementation with the important role of coordinating the related policy dia-
logue with the donor community. Moreover, MONRE leads the National Climate Change 
Strategy. With this it assumes the role of Standing Office for Climate Change and has the 
mandate to “lead and coordinate with other sectors and localities to govern the implemen-
tation of the Strategy” (Government of Vietnam, 2011, p. 16). Even in Indonesia, where 
the environment ministry has the weakest overall mandate, it has assumed important co-
ordination functions, such as the development of the Indonesian Climate Change Sectoral 
Roadmap (Government of Indonesia, 2009).  
Only in China, despite the upgrade of the environment ministry in 2008, it does not have a 
coordinating role comparable to ministries in other countries. Following the traditional log-
ic of Chinese governance, (environmental) policy integration remains the task of the pow-
erful State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission. 
4.2 Climate Policy and Strategies for Green Growth and Clean Technology De-
velopment Drive Innovation in Policy Instruments  
Beyond the development of high-level strategies, climate change and the development of 
low-carbon technologies have also spearheaded the introduction of a number of innovative 
policy instruments. Again in India, this has been particularly visible. In the effort to in-
crease investments in renewable energy sources, the government has recently launched 
the trading of so-called renewable energy certificates (RECs). The scheme builds on the 
Electricity Act passed in 2003, which stipulates that power distributors in India are obliged 
to progressively increase their procurement of power from renewable sources. To facilitate 
investments in areas that are most suitable for renewable energy production, distributors 
may now purchase RECs from producers around the country to meet their obligations 
(Ernst&Young, 2011; Soonee, Garg, & Prakash, 2010). Another trading scheme known as 
Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) has been launched in the context of the National Mission 
for Enhanced Energy Efficiency. Building on almost a decade of capacity building, the Bu-
reau of Energy Efficiency has set Specific Energy Consumption (SEC) targets for a number 
of designated firms. If these firms exceed their targets, they are eligible for so-called En-
ergy Savings Certificates (ESCerts) that can be sold to an underperforming firm (Dube, 
Awasthi, & Dhariwal, 2011; Ministry of Power, 2012; Roy, 2011).  
As the government gains experience with these new policy instruments, these initiatives in 
the energy sector may also stimulate action in more traditional fields of environmental 
policy. Citing the introduction of the PAT scheme, the Minister of the Environment an-
nounced plans to adopt a trading scheme for air pollutants. To be piloted in the State of 
Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, the scheme would include a range of air pollutants including but 
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not limited to CO2 (Gosh, 2010; Srinivasan, 2011; The Hindu Business Line, 2011; van den 
Bergh, Faber, Idenburg, & Oosterhuis, 2007). Similarly, in Vietnam the debate on climate 
change initiated an ecological tax reform, which has ultimately also addressed other envi-
ronmental challenges. Under development since 2004, the government passed the Law on 
Environmental Protection Tax in November 2010. The law imposes taxes not only on coal 
and oil-based fuels but also on plastic bags, HCFC, pesticides and other chemical products 
(Willenbockel, 2010). 
Also in China and Indonesia, a number of innovations in climate policy and clean technolo-
gy promotion are visible, alhtough spillovers to traditional environmental policy are less 
apparent. As a late starter in the field of climate policy, the Indonesian government is em-
barking on a program to adjust fiscal and tax incentives to promote reductions in CO2. In a 
Green Paper published by the Ministry of Finance in 2009, it presents economic and fiscal 
strategies for climate change mitigation (Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2009). It proposes 
the phase-out of fuel subsidies, as agreed at the G20 in Pittsburgh, followed by the intro-
duction of a carbon tax/levy. According to announcements by the government, this will be 
introduced before the end of the current government’s tenure in 2014 and subsequently 
increased by 5 percent per year until 2020 (Indonesian Ministry of Finance, 2009; Jotzo & 
Mazouz, 2009). Once adequate carbon accounting systems are in place, it wants to consid-
er converting the tax into an emissions trading scheme. Due to its large forestry reserves, 
the international REDD-framework (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrada-
tion) is another central pillar of Indonesian climate change policy. In cooperation with civil 
society and the private sector, the Indonesian government has developed a REDD-Strategy 
and Readiness Plan as well as a long-term strategy for its forestry sector (2006-2025) and 
has implemented a number of important administrative reforms to create a more effective 
forest management framework.  
In China, a major push has come in the area of energy efficiency and clean technology de-
velopment. The latest, twelfth five-year plan for 2011-2015 includes an ambitious agenda 
for the promotion of non-fossil energy sources and the acceleration of green technology 
development (Lewis, 2011; Remais & Zhang, 2011). A key component is the promotion of 
seven so-called “strategic emerging industries”, including new energy, energy conservation 
and environmental protection and clean energy vehicles (APCO, 2010).  
To promote these strategic industries, the government has not only made major invest-
ments in technology development, it has also implemented a number of innovative policy 
instruments. Energy-efficient products are supported by new audit schemes and public 
procurement (German Ministry of Environment (BMU), 2009; K. Jacob, Kahlenborn, Bär, & 
Knopf, 2010), while renewable energy technologies are being supported with feed-in tariff 
schemes, guaranteed purchases and a host of other subsidies (Pew Charitable Trusts, 
2010). Under its New Energy Vehicle Development Plan the government has introduced in-
tegrated promotion schemes in 25 cities, where it combines public procurement of electric 




cars, public investments in recharging infrastructure and subsidies for private buyers of e-
vehicles (Y. Liu, 2011; World Bank & PRTM, 2011).  
Moreover, a broader change to the country’s government procurement policies has enabled 
the Chinese government to focus its government purchasing power on fostering innovative, 
environmentally-friendly and energy-efficient products. The 2002 Law on Government Pro-
curement authorizes the government to utilize the procurement of goods and services to 
foster secondary policy goals (besides the need being addressed). These goals include the 
promotion of products that are domestically produced, environmentally-friendly, innova-
tive or energy-efficient (US-China Business Council, 2010). Based on this law, the State 
Council has been able to channel massive resources into the technology fields mentioned 
above (K. Jacob et al., 2010).  
Finally, in November 2011, the government issued a White Paper on Climate Change Poli-
cies and Actions in which it announced a plan to gradually establish a carbon market (G. 
Han, Olsson, Hallding, & Lunsford, 2012, p. 12; Lewis, 2011). In early 2012, the NDRC for-
mally announced the first seven pilot regions for an emissions trading scheme that is sup-
posed to lay the foundations for a nation-wide carbon-trading scheme starting in 2015 (Ma, 
2012; Reuters, 2011; J. Watts, 2011a). Additionally, there are plans to introduce a carbon 
tax, which have stirred an intense debate (Chen, 2009; Lin & Yang, 2012).  
5 Conclusion 
The analysis of capacities for environmental governance in the four countries reveals that 
there are differing levels of capacity. On the one hand, there is the traditional agenda of 
environmental protection. Despite the enactment of relevant environmental legislation in 
all countries, implementation and enforcement remains a serious challenge in this area. 
Furthermore, environmental actors within government are too weak to effectively promote 
the integration of environmental concerns into other policy domains or at the subnational 
level of decision-making. Civil society organizations are not able to compensate for these 
administrative weaknesses. The new agenda of environmental protection, on the other 
hand, has developed at a much greater pace in recent years. Such policy initiatives are of-
ten directly linked, if not driven by, the international agenda. Official responsibility for 
these initiatives remains largely with the heads of governments or in the hands of institu-
tions for central economic planning. As a result, these initiatives enjoy a higher priority 
than the traditional agenda of environmental protection. Moreover, especially in China, 
these initiatives are clearly linked to the motivation to compete in the sphere of a rapidly 
growing international market for clean technologies.  
Regardless of the specific drivers, these new policy initiatives signal an important shift in 
national priorities. The increasing importance placed on climate policy and the develop-
ment of an eco-efficient economy is accompanied by the willingness to experiment with 
new policy tools and institutional mechanisms. The environmental policy arena in Asia has 
R. Quitzow, H. Bär und K. Jacob 
 
22 
long lagged behind the economic policy agenda in the use of market-based instruments and 
financial incentives. However, the schemes mentioned above are testimony to the fact 
that times are changing. Moreover, new institutional mechanisms for promoting policy in-
tegration are being created. National councils on climate change are bringing relevant sec-
toral ministries to the table, partly under the coordination of the respective ministries of 
the environment.  
It is remains to be seen to what extent environmental ministries will profit from this, and 
whether they will be able to further strengthen their leadership positions in these new ini-
tiatives. Tentative signs of positive spillovers into more traditional areas of environmental 
protection, especially in India and Vietnam, as well as recent reform in the wider environ-
mental legislation in China may be seen as indications for this. On the other hand, climate 
policies may also develop as economic or industrial policies without taking into considera-
tion the wider spectrum of the traditional environmental agenda.  
An optimistic scenario may assume further spillover effects emerging from the capacity 
building in the realm of the new environmental agenda. The pace of ecological moderniza-
tion may further accelerate, offering support to a broader agenda of environmental pro-
tection. In certain areas, these countries may even become pioneers, offering lessons to 
the rest of the world. To achieve substantial improvements, however, parallel institution 
building will have to continue, so that basic requirements for sound environmental govern-
ance can be put in place. If these continue to lag behind, efforts in the realm of climate 
change and clean technology development may remain isolated islands of excellence with 
few benefits for traditional environmental governance.  
In the short term to medium term, a heterogeneous system of environmental governance is 
likely to evolve in these Asian countries. They will be both policy entrepreneurs and lag-
gards, scrambling to establish the required institutional foundation for effective environ-
mental governance. Which of the two scenarios depicted above is ultimately realized re-
mains a matter of (political) choice. Capacity building for environmental governance may 
prioritize climate change and the emerging markets for clean technologies – or alternative-
ly they may take into account the wider spectrum of environmental policies. This may be 
at the discretion of prime ministers and institutions for economic planning. Or capacity 
building could emphasize the strengthening of environmental ministries, providing them 
with additional competencies and political clout.  
In the long run, however, it is unlikely that Asian societies will accept the widening gap 
between the modern and the traditional agenda of environmental protection. While clean 
technology development and efficiency measures may enable Asian countries to slow down 
environmental degradation in certain areas, this cannot fully compensate for weak capaci-
ties in the traditional realm of environmental governance. The continuation of economic 
growth at the expense of the environment is thus likely to generate societal pressure to 
improve environmental governance more broadly. In anticipation of this, it appears expe-




dient for both political leaders and international supporters to capitalize on the current 
momentum in the realm of climate policy and clean technology development to build more 
comprehensive capacities for environmental governance. 
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